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ABSTRACT
As the number of wireless telephone users continues to
proliferate, so does the number of lawsuits against wireless service
providers. While consumers seek to utilize various consumerfriendly state law causes of action, the wireless industry continues
to push for a uniform federal regulatory regime. Ambiguous
language in the Federal Communications Act of 1934 (“FCA”) and
disagreement among the federal circuits has led to much confusion
over whether state law claims affecting wireless rates and market
entry are removable to federal court by way of “complete
preemption.” This iBrief argues that FCA’s preemption power is
limited by its savings clause, failure to establish a comprehensive
regulatory scheme, and provision of a significant role for state
regulation. Accordingly, the Seventh Circuit erred in Bastien v.
AT&T Wireless Services, Inc. when it concluded that the FCA
completely preempts certain state law claims against wireless
service providers and thereby requires their removal to federal
court.

INTRODUCTION
In the last decade, wireless telephone usage in the United States has
grown at an extraordinary rate. Between 1998 and 2003, the number of
wireless subscribers exploded from 69.2 million to 158.7 million.2 During
the same time period, the usage of wireless service (also known as
commercial mobile radio service, or “CMRS”) quintupled from 143 to 813
average monthly minutes of use per subscriber.3 Not surprisingly, the rapid
¶1
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growth of users has coincided with an increasing number of consumer
lawsuits against wireless service providers over poor service quality and
suspicious “routine billing practices.”4
In order to alleviate the litigation burden, the wireless industry
advocates limiting state court jurisdiction over claims against wireless
service providers.5 This position has been countered by plaintiffs’
attorneys, who generally prefer litigating in state court, and those who argue
that state laws are vital to protecting consumers from illicit business
practices.6 These diverging interests have been complicated by the Federal
Communications Act of 19347 (“FCA”), which preempts state regulation
over certain aspects of wireless service by granting the Federal
Communications Commission (“FCC”) the exclusive authority to regulate
these areas.8 Yet, the FCA does not clearly delineate which aspects of
¶2
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wireless service may be regulated by the states.9 Ensuing litigation
therefore has involved plaintiffs carefully pleading only state law claims to
avoid FCC jurisdiction and wireless service providers arguing that these
claims must be removed to federal court because they are preempted by the
FCA.10 As the scope of FCA preemption is unclear, judicial analysis of the
preemption question has been “inconsistent, unpredictable and often factspecific.”11
¶3
Thus far, only two United States Circuit Courts of Appeals have
addressed the issue directly. In 1998, the Second Circuit, in Marcus v.
AT&T Corp.,12 read the FCA’s preemption provision narrowly.13 Its narrow
reading meant that even those claims that are preempted would still not be
removable to federal court. However, in 2000 the Seventh Circuit, in
Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Services, Inc.,14 held that the FCA completely
preempts any state law claim affecting service quality or rates charged to
customers, therefore subjecting such claims to federal jurisdiction.15 As
will be discussed in greater detail below, while the wireless industry
immediately embraced the Bastien court’s holding, many state and federal
district courts have not. The scope of FCA preemption thus remains in
dispute.

Precisely which state claims are preempted is beyond the scope of
this iBrief. Rather, this iBrief argues that whatever the scope of the FCA’s
preemption clause may be, Bastien misapplied the complete preemption
doctrine in permitting the removal of the state claims to federal court.
When compared with other statutes that have been found to completely
preempt state regulations, it is clear that the FCA does not have the
extraordinary preemptive force necessary to find complete preemption.
After laying out the legal framework surrounding the FCA and complete
preemption, this iBrief further analyzes Bastien through the prism of recent
United States Supreme Court preemption jurisprudence. This investigation
¶4
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shows that the FCA only supports a more limited form of federal
preemption of state law claims against wireless service providers.

I. BASTIEN’S LEGAL CONTEXT
A. The Federal Communications Act of 1934
As part of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993,16
Congress amended the FCA to “dramatically revise the regulation of the
wireless telecommunications industry, of which cellular telephone service is
a part.”17 The pertinent statutory language of the FCA provides that “[n]o
State or local government shall have any authority to regulate the entry of or
the rates charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile
service, except that this paragraph shall not prohibit a State from regulating
the other terms and conditions of commercial mobile services.”18
¶5

As straightforward as this clause may seem, its preemptive effect on
state law is unclear when read in conjunction with the FCA’s savings
clause, which provides that “[n]othing in this chapter shall in any way
abridge or alter the remedies now existing at common law or by statute, but
the provisions of this chapter are in addition to such remedies.”19
¶6

As discussed below, much of the confusion over the FCA’s
preemptive force has involved interpreting the meaning of “entry of or the
rates charged” by wireless companies, and what is covered under “other
terms and conditions.” To help resolve this question, many of the courts
evaluating the FCA’s preemptive force have relied on a report by the House
of Representatives Budget Committee commenting on the proposed
legislation.20 The report states:
¶7

Section 332(c)(3) provides that state or local governments cannot
impose rate or entry regulation on private land mobile service or
commercial mobile services; this paragraph further stipulates that
nothing here shall preclude a state from regulating the other terms and
conditions of commercial mobile services. It is the intent of the
Committee that the states still would be able to regulate the terms and
conditions of these services. By "terms and conditions," the
Committee intends to include such matters as customer billing
16

Pub. L. No. 103-66, 107 Stat. 312 (1993) (codified in relevant part at 47
U.S.C. § 332 (2000)).
17
Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842, 845 (2d Cir. 1996).
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47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000).
19
Id. § 414.
20
See, e.g., Moriconi v. AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 2d 867, 87374 (E.D. Ark. 2003); Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1306
(N.D. Ala. 2003).
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information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer
protection matters; facilities siting issues (e.g., zoning); transfers of
control; the bundling of services and equipment; and the requirement
that carriers make capacity available on a wholesale basis or such
other matters as fall within a state's lawful authority. This list is
intended to be illustrative only and not meant to preclude other matters
generally understood to fall under "terms and conditions."21
¶8
While this paragraph assists courts in weeding out cases that clearly
concern “other terms and conditions,” it has not been helpful in discerning
which cases involve state regulation of “rates charged” by wireless service
providers. Some courts have interpreted “rates charged” expansively,
encompassing any regulation that might have even an indirect impact on
what a customer pays for wireless service.22 Other courts, however, have
interpreted “rates charged” narrowly, including only those regulations that
directly challenge the price charged by wireless service providers.23

B. Complete Preemption and the Well-Pleaded Complaint Rule
¶9
To keep their claims in state court, many consumer-plaintiffs rely
on the well-pleaded complaint rule. The well-pleaded complaint rule
governs the presence or absence of federal subject matter jurisdiction. In
general, a civil action filed in state court may be removed to federal court
only if the claim is one “arising under” federal law.24 Where both state and
federal law create a similar cause of action, a plaintiff, as “master of the
claim,” may obtain federal jurisdiction by raising the federal claim or,
conversely, “may avoid federal jurisdiction by exclusive reliance on state
law.”25 In light of this principle, the well-pleaded complaint rule provides
that “federal jurisdiction exists only when a federal question is presented on

21

H.R. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
See, e.g., Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 988 (7th Cir.
2000) (“In practice, most consumer complaints will involve the rates charged by
telephone companies or their quality of service.”).
23
See, e.g., Cellco P’ship v. Hatch, Civ.04-2981 (JRT/SRN), 2004 WL
2065807, at *4 (D. Minn. Sept. 3, 2004) (reasoning that although a state law
regulating changes to service contracts “certainly implicates rates,” it does not
constitute “impermissible rate regulation” because “[n]othing in the law
prevents wireless providers from charging any rate the market will bear.” );
Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 876 (“[A]ny challenge to a wireless service
provider’s practices, if successful, is likely to impact rates . . ., but this indirect
result does not convert such challenges into a direct challenge to rates and
market entry contemplated by the preemptive language of the statute.”).
24
28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2000).
25
Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987).
22
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the face of the plaintiff’s properly pleaded complaint.”26 Thus, a defendant
cannot remove a case to federal court solely based on the defense that a
plaintiff’s state law claim is preempted by federal law, even if the plaintiff’s
complaint anticipates the possibility of federal preemption.27
¶10
There are, however, two exceptions to this rule. The first is
complete preemption, which occurs when Congress intends the preemptive
force of a statute to be “so ‘extraordinary’ that it ‘converts an ordinary state
common-law complaint into one stating a federal claim for purposes of the
well-pleaded complaint rule.’”28 From then on, “any claim purportedly
based on that pre-empted state law is considered, from its inception, a
federal claim, and therefore arises under federal law.”29
¶11
Complete preemption should not be confused with the more
familiar ordinary preemption. While complete preemption serves as a
means of circumventing the well-pleaded complaint rule and removing a
case to federal court even though no federal claim is pleaded, ordinary
preemption merely “operates to dismiss state claims on the merits and may
be invoked in either federal or state court.”30 For example, in Lorillard
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly,31 the only consequence of the Supreme Court’s
finding that certain state advertising laws were preempted by the Federal
Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act32 through ordinary preemption was
that the plaintiff’s preempted state law claims were dismissed.33
¶12
The second exception to the well-pleaded complaint rule is the
artful pleading doctrine, which provides that “a plaintiff may not defeat
removal by omitting to plead necessary federal questions.”34 Several
federal courts have used this doctrine instead of the complete preemption
doctrine to remove state law claims against wireless service providers to

26

Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1303 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(quoting Louisville & Nashville R.R. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908)).
27
Id. at 1303-04 (quoting Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998)).
28
Caterpillar, 482 U.S. at 393 (quoting Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58, 65 (1987)).
29
Id.
30
Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (quoting Blab TV
of Mobile, Inc. v. Comcast Cable Comms., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 855 (11th Cir.
1999)).
31
533 U.S. 525 (2001).
32
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
33
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 553. Cf. Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs.,
Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (permitting plaintiff’s preempted claims
to be removed to federal court upon finding complete preemption).
34
Rivet v. Regions Bank, 522 U.S. 470, 475 (1998) (quoting Franchise Tax Bd.
of Cal. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 US. 1, 22 (1983)).
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federal court.35 For the purposes of this iBrief, these cases are analogous to
cases analyzing federal removal jurisdiction under the complete preemption
doctrine since “complete preemption is a prerequisite for application of the
artful pleading doctrine.”36
¶13
Because complete preemption is only found “[w]hen federal
common or statutory law so utterly dominates a preempted field that all
claims brought within that field necessarily arise under federal law,” cases
removing state law claims to federal court based on complete preemption
are rare.37 As of this writing, the Supreme Court has only found complete
preemption in the context of certain labor statutes and a few other
specialized areas of federal law.38
¶14
The unique policies underlying statutes that have the preemptive
force necessary to circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule are best
appreciated by way of example. Congress enacted the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 197439 (“ERISA”) in order to “provide a

35

See, e.g., Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SACV 03-130 DOC, 2003 WL
21530185, at *9 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 18, 2003) (“Plaintiffs claims challenging the
expiration of unused minutes and delayed billing practices are artfully pled
federal claims that raise a federal question.”).
36
Nixon v. Nextel West Corp., 248 F. Supp. 2d 885, 893 (E.D. Mo. 2003)
(citing Rivet, 522 U.S. at 475).
37
Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (discussing the
“limited applicability of the complete preemption doctrine”). See also Smith v.
GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1311 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting that complete
preemption occurs under “rare circumstances”).
38
See Metro. Life. Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 65-66 (1987) (holding state
contract and tort claims completely preempted by the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974); Avco Corp. v. Machinists, 390 U.S. 557, 558
(1968) (state law claims completely preempted by § 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act). See also Beneficial Nat. Bank v. Anderson, 539
U.S. 1, 11 (2003) (holding state law usury claims against national banks
completely preempted by the National Bank Act); El Paso Natural Gas Co. v.
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (holding tort actions arising out of nuclear
accidents completely preempted by the Price-Anderson Act); Oneida Indian
Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 678 (1974) (holding state claim
regarding the right to possession of Indian tribal lands necessarily “arises under”
several federal laws and treaties).
39
Pub. L. No. 93-406, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seq. (2000) [hereinafter
ERISA]. ERISA is representative of the policy considerations underlying
complete preemption. The Supreme Court recently said that ERISA’s
preemptive force “mirror[s]” that of § 301 of the Labor Management Relations
Act (“LMRA”), which is the statute most commonly found to circumvent the
well-pleaded complaint rule through complete preemption. Aetna Health Inc. v.
Davila, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2496 (2004); Caterpillar Inc. v. Williams,
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uniform regulatory regime over employee benefit plans.”40 Accordingly,
Section 514(a) states that ERISA “shall supersede any and all State laws
insofar as they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan.”41
ERISA’s “extraordinary pre-emptive power” is necessary because “[t]he
policy choices reflected in the inclusion of certain remedies and the
exclusion of others under the federal scheme would be completely
undermined if ERISA-plan participants and beneficiaries were free to obtain
remedies under state law that Congress rejected” when enacting the
statute.42 Hence, “any state-law cause of action that duplicates,
supplements, or supplants the ERISA civil enforcement remedy conflicts
with the clear congressional intent to make the ERISA remedy exclusive
and is therefore pre-empted.”43 As the Supreme Court’s discussion of
ERISA makes clear, complete preemption is only found when permitting
state remedies to infringe on a federal law’s legislative domain would
completely undermine Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute.

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT FINDS COMPLETE PREEMPTION
¶15
Steven Bastien’s lawsuit against AT&T Wireless Services began
just like the many other consumer lawsuits brought against wireless service
providers in the late 1990’s. Little could anyone have known that his case
would have such a profound affect on the wireless litigation landscape.
Bastien, a Chicago resident, signed up for AT&T’s wireless service in 1998,
but soon became dissatisfied with the service’s coverage.44 The poor
coverage provided by AT&T’s network caused many of Bastien’s calls to
be “dropped,” or cut off in mid-call.45 Upset about the number of dropped
calls, and the fact that he was charged for each one, Bastien filed a
complaint with the FCC.46 The FCC told him that it could not provide any
assistance because AT&T was not in violation of any FCC regulations.47
Having no other avenue of relief, Bastien filed a complaint in Illinois state
court, alleging that AT&T breached its service contract and violated various
provisions of the Illinois Consumer Fraud Act.48

482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (“the complete pre-emption corollary…is applied
primarily in cases raising claims pre-empted by § 301 of the LMRA.”).
40
Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
41
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) (2000).
42
Aetna, 124 S. Ct. at 2495.
43
Id.
44
Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., 205 F.3d 983, 985 (7th Cir. 2000).
45
Id.
46
Id.
47
Id.
48
Id. (citing 815 ILL. COMP. STAT. 505/2).
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Arguing that Congress had expressly preempted state regulation of
rates and market entry for wireless service in Section 332 of the FCA,
AT&T removed the case to federal court.49 Bastien had carefully couched
his complaint only in terms of Illinois state law, and accordingly moved to
remand the case back to state court due to lack of federal subject matter
jurisdiction.50 Finding complete preemption, the district court judge denied
Bastien’s motion to remand.51 Bastien appealed to the Seventh Circuit,
which affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to remand, but
dismissed the case on other grounds.52
¶16

¶17
Like the other courts that have dealt with similar claims, the
Seventh Circuit had to reconcile the express preemption of state laws
regulating rates and market entry in Section 332, and the savings clause in
Section 414. The court chose to read the savings clause narrowly, reasoning
that “[t]o read the clause expansively would abrogate the very federal
regulation of mobile telephone providers that the act intended to create.”53
Thus, the court concluded that

The two clauses read together create separate spheres of responsibility,
one exclusively federal and the other allowing concurrent state and
federal regulation. Cases that involved “the entry of or the rates
charged by any commercial mobile service or any private mobile
service” are the province of federal regulators and courts . . . . The
states remain free to regulate “other terms and conditions” of mobile
telephone service.54

While this conclusion alone was not extraordinary, what was
remarkable, at least compared to the holdings of other courts, was the
Seventh Circuit’s expansive reading of what constituted regulation of “the
entry of or the rates charged” by wireless service providers. Relying on the
Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T Co. v. Central Office Telephone,55
which dealt with long-distance telephone rates, the court reasoned that “a
complaint that service quality is poor is really an attack on the rates charged
for the service and may be treated as a federal case regardless of whether
the issue was framed in terms of state law.”56 Additionally, the court held
¶18

49

Id. at 985-86.
Id. at 986.
51
Id.; Bastien v. AT&T Wireless Svcs., Inc., No. 99 C 49, 1999 WL 259939, at
*4 (N.D. Ill. Apr. 21, 1999).
52
Bastien, 205 F.3d at 986.
53
Id. at 987.
54
Id.
55
524 U.S. 214 (1998).
56
Bastien, 205 F.3d at 988 (citing Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. at 223 (“Any claim
for excessive rates can be couched as a claim for inadequate services and vice
versa.”)).
50
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that since the quality of service is directly related to the number of cellular
towers and other infrastructure, an attack on service quality is preempted by
the FCC’s regulation of the terms of market entry.57 Thus, the court
determined that Bastien’s complaint was actually an attack on the rates
charged for service, the terms on which AT&T entered the Chicago market,
and the FCC-approved schedule for building cellular towers and
establishing service in the Chicago area. Since the FCA expressly preempts
state regulation of rates and market entry, the court held that the state law
breach of contract and consumer fraud claims were removable to federal
court.58
The impact of Bastien was felt almost immediately in courts
throughout the country. Wireless service providers had been arguing for
some time that the standard applied to long distance telephone rates in
Central Office Telephone should be applied to wireless regulations.59 Now
a circuit court had finally agreed with them. Within a few weeks of the
Seventh Circuit’s decision in Bastien, state courts in California and New
York held that breach of contract claims touched upon rates and were
therefore preempted by the FCA.60 Some federal district courts, mostly
within the Seventh Circuit, also followed the Bastien court’s complete
preemption analysis.61 Many others, however, did not.62 They instead
chose to follow the Second Circuit’s narrower reading of Section 332. Yet,
¶19

57

Id. (citing 47 C.F.R. §§ 24.103 (geographic and population coverage
requirements), 24.132 (narrowband antenna power and height requirements)).
58
Id. at 989-90. The court’s conclusion was bolstered by the fact that Bastien’s
allegations of fraud and misrepresentation were conclusory and contained few
supporting facts. Rather, the factual allegations in the complaint mostly
suggested that AT&T had not sufficiently built up its wireless network.
59
See In re Wireless Consumer Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021, 17029 n. 47
(2000) (“CMRS providers regularly cite filed rate cases [which apply to landline telephone service] in support of their position.”).
60
Union Ink Co., Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 801 A.2d 361, 372 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 2002) (citing Ball v. GTE Mobilnet, 81 Cal. App. 4th 529 (2000); Naevus
Int’l, Inc. v. AT&T Corp., 713 N.Y.S.2d 642 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2000)).
61
See, e.g., Phillips v. AT&T Wireless, No. 4:04-CV-40240, 2004 WL 1737385,
at *6 (S.D. Iowa July 29, 2004); Franczyk v. Cingular Wireless, LLC, No. 03 C
6473, 2004 WL 178395, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 21, 2004); Alport v. Sprint Corp.,
No. 03 C 6246, 2003 WL 22872134, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 4, 2003); Aubrey v.
Ameritech Mobile Comms., No. 00-75080, 2002 WL 32521813, at *3 (E.D.
Mich. June 17, 2002). But see Fedor v. Cingular Wireless Corp., 355 F.3d 1069,
1073 (7th Cir. 2004) (distinguishing, but not overruling, Bastien).
62
See, e.g., Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001); In re
Wireless Tel. Radio Frequency Emissions Prods. Liab. Litig., 327 F. Supp. 2d
554, 565-66 (D. Md. 2004); Lewis v. Nextel Comms., Inc., 281 F. Supp. 2d
1302, 1305-06 (N.D. Ala. 2003); Gattegno v. Sprint Corp., 297 F. Supp. 2d 372,
377 (D. Mass. 2003).
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in courts throughout the country, wireless service providers continue to cite
Bastien in support of their motions to dismiss state law claims and remove
them to federal court on complete preemption grounds.63 Hence, four years
after Bastien was decided, its holding is still vigorously disputed in
consumer lawsuits against wireless service providers.

III. MISAPPLICATION OF THE COMPLETE PREEMPTION DOCTRINE?
¶20
Since it was decided, Bastien has been criticized on numerous
grounds. Although it is often criticized for its broad interpretation of “rates
and market entry,” few courts have addressed the Bastien court’s
application of the complete preemption doctrine to circumvent the wellpleaded complaint rule. In this area, as the Eleventh Circuit noted in Smith
v. GTE Corp.,64 Bastien has caused “a substantial amount of confusion
between the complete preemption doctrine and the broader and more
familiar doctrine of ordinary preemption.”65 Even if Bastien’s claims were
preempted, the Seventh Circuit misapplied the complete preemption
doctrine by permitting their removal to federal court. Instead, the Seventh
Circuit should have remanded Bastien’s claims back to state court where
AT&T’s preemption defense belonged.

A. Congressional Intent
¶21
Congressional intent is the “touchstone” of a federal district court’s
removal jurisdiction.66 Removal by complete preemption is therefore only
permitted when “Congress has clearly manifested an intent” to make a
specific action within a particular field subject to federal jurisdiction.67 No
such intent can be found in the FCA. The Seventh Circuit thus erred in
applying the complete preemption doctrine to Bastien’s breach of contract
and state fraud claims and by permitting their removal to federal court.

The Bastien court’s improper application of the complete
preemption doctrine is best seen when compared with the Supreme Court’s
analysis of other statutes found to have the preemptive force necessary to
circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule. The most recent case finding a

¶22

63

See, e.g., Wireless Tel. Radio, 327 F. Supp. 2d at 565 n.16 (“defendants...have
relied on Bastien in their briefs”); Petitioners’ Brief on the Merits, Bryceland v.
AT&T Corp., 114 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. App. 2002), appeal docketed, No. 03-0948
(Tex. April 9, 2004) (relying on Bastien to argue that plaintiff’s state law claims
were preempted by the FCA). Brief is available at 2004 WL 874837, at *13.
64
236 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2001).
65
Id. at 1313 (discussing preemption in the context of a claim arising under FCA
§ 207).
66
Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58, 66 (1987).
67
Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (citing Metro. Life,
481 U.S. at 66).
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new area of complete preemption is Beneficial National Bank v. Anderson,68
which dealt with the National Bank Act’s69 (“NBA”) preemption of state
usury claims against national banks.70 The Court in Beneficial began its
analysis by stating that the focus of the complete preemption inquiry is on
whether the NBA “provide[s] the exclusive cause of action” for such
claims.71 The Court found that it did, reasoning that “[b]ecause §§ 85 and
86 provide the exclusive cause of action for such claims, there is, in short,
no such thing as a state-law claim of usury against a national bank.”72
Central to the Court’s analysis were early cases decided soon after the
passage of the NBA holding that the NBA formed a comprehensive system
of usury regulations and “the power to supplement it by State legislation is
conferred neither expressly nor by implication.”73 The Court also
recognized the importance of “[u]niform [national] rules limiting the
liability of national banks and prescribing exclusive remedies for their
overcharges,” which are needed to protect the banking system from
“possible unfriendly State legislation.”74
Unlike the Beneficial Court, the Bastien court failed to engage in a
comprehensive analysis of the legislative intent behind the FCA’s
preemption clause. Had the court done so, it would have identified several
factors indicating Congress intended only ordinary preemption. Each will
be addressed in turn.

¶23

1. Savings Clause
¶24
The first, and perhaps most obvious, factor limiting the FCA’s
preemption power is the savings clause. None of the statutes that have
previously been found to have the preemptive force necessary for complete
preemption, such as Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act
(“LMRA”)75 and ERISA, have such extensive limitations on their
preemption powers.76 In contrast to the Beneficial Court’s conclusion that
68

539 U.S. 1 (2003)
12 U.S.C. §§ 85-86 (2000).
70
Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 3-4. It is not uncommon for courts to evaluate the
preemptive force of a statute by comparing it to the language of other statutes
that have also been found to completely preempt state law claims. See Metro.
Life Ins., 481 U.S. at 65-66 (comparing the language of the LMRA and ERISA
to determine ERISA’s preemptive force).
71
Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 9.
72
Id. at 11.
73
Id. at 10 (quoting Farmers’ and Mechanics’ Nat’l Bank. v. Dearing, 91 U.S.
29, 35 (1875)).
74
Id. (quoting Tiffany v. Nat’l Bank. of Mo., 85 U.S. 409, 412 (1874)).
75
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (2000).
76
See Gatton v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., No. SAVC 03-130, 2003 WL 21530185, at
*6 (C.D. Cal. April 18, 2003) (lack of savings clauses in LMRA and ERISA is
69
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there is no such thing as a state law usury claim, the existence of the FCA’s
savings clause, the Smith court explained, “contemplates the application of
state-law and the exercise of state-court jurisdiction” and “counsels against
a conclusion that the purpose behind the [FCA] was to replicate” the
preemptive force found in ERISA and the LMRA.77 Had Congress intended
to completely preempt all state law claims that even remotely involve the
setting of rates, as the Bastien court held, such an expansive savings clause
would not have been included.
2. No Fear of State Interference
¶25
Unlike other statutes that completely preempt state regulations in
their respective fields, there is no evidence that Congress feared state
intrusion in wireless regulation.78 One of the goals of the NBA was to
protect the national banking systems from “unfriendly State litigation.”79
Similarly, the “expansive pre-emption provisions” of ERISA “are intended
to ensure that employee benefit plan regulation would be ‘exclusively a
federal concern.’”80
¶26
To the contrary, the FCA refuses to make wireless regulation an
exclusively federal concern by explicitly providing for a substantial state
role in regulating “other terms and conditions” of wireless service.81
Notably, the House Committee Report accompanying the Omnibus Budget

indicative of limited FCA preemption). Cf. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(b)(2)(A) (2000)
(limiting ERISA’s preemption power specifically in the areas of insurance,
banking, and securities).
77
Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (savings clause
discussed in the context of § 207 of the FCA) (quoting Blab TV of Mobile, Inc.
v. Comcast Cable Comm., Inc., 182 F.3d 851, 854 (11th Cir. 1999)). See also
Lewis v. Nextel Comm., 281 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1305 (N.D. Ala. 2003)
(applying Smith to § 332).
78
The FCC has been ambiguous in its view on the role of state CMRS
regulation. Compare In re Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the
Communications Act, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1421 (1994) (“While we recognize that
states have a legitimate interest in protecting the interests of telecommunications
users in their jurisdictions, we also believe that competition is a strong protector
of these interests and that state regulation in this context could inadvertently
become as a burden to the development of this competition.”) with In re
Southwestern Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 14 F.C.C.R. 19898, 19903 (1999) (“We
therefore do not agree . . . [that the FCA’s] preference for competition over
regulation results in a general exemption for the CMRS industry from the
neutral application of state contractual or consumer fraud laws.”).
79
Beneficial, 539 U.S. at 9.
80
Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, __ U.S. __, 124 S.Ct. 2488, 2495 (2004) (quoting
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523 (1981). See also ERISA
§ 514, 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (preemption provision).
81
47 U.S.C. § 332(c)(3)(A) (2000).
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Reconciliation Act of 1993 specifically states that “consumer billing
information and practices and billing disputes and other consumer
protection matters” are subject to state regulation.82 Moreover, “Congress
allowed a state to retain regulatory authority over CMRS rates on a showing
that market conditions fail adequately to [sic] protect consumers.”83 Thus,
as the Second Circuit recognized in Marcus, “while the FCA does evidence
a federal interest in uniformity of charges in telecommunications, . . . it does
not indicate a uniquely federal interest” in protecting customers from unfair
business practices.84
3. Lack of Comprehensiveness
¶27
The FCA’s preemptive force is also limited by its failure to
establish a comprehensive legislative scheme for addressing all claims that
relate to rates and market entry. Unlike the NBA’s comprehensive system
of usury regulations, the FCA’s causes of action only cover a limited piece
of the telecommunications pie.
¶28
Because of its limited scope, the FCA is not the exclusive remedy
available to aggrieved consumers. For instance, the FCA provides
consumers with a federal cause of action to challenge a wireless provider’s
unreasonable rates or inadequate service.85 It fails, however, “to provide
any federal remedies for deceptive advertising or billing practices,” which
are commonly covered by state law causes of action.86 This negates a “vital
feature” of complete preemption, which is the existence of a federal remedy
replacing all preempted state causes of action.87 Consequently, the FCA not
only fails to manifest a clear Congressional intent to preempt state law
consumer protection claims, it actually “evidences Congress's intent to
allow such claims to proceed under state law.”88

82

H.R. Rep. No. 103-111 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 378, 588.
Conn. Dept of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842, 850 (2d Cir. 1996)
(citing 47 U.S.C. §§ 332(c)(3)(A)(i) & (B) (Sup. V 1993)).
84
Marcus v. AT&T Corp., 138 F.3d 46, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (internal citations
omitted). See also Cedar Rapids Cellular Tel., L.P. v. Miller, 280 F.3d 874, 880
(8th Cir. 2002) (citing California v. ARC Am. Corp., 490 U.S. 93, 101 (1989))
(“States have a long history of regulating against unfair business practices.”).
85
Moriconi v. AT&T Wireless PCS, LLC, 280 F. Supp. 2d 867, 874 (E.D. Ark
2003). See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 207 (2000) (establishing a federal cause of action
for persons injured by FCA violations).
86
Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 874.
87
King v. Marriott Int’l, Inc., 337 F.3d 421, 425 (4th Cir. 2003).
88
Marcus, 138 F.3d at 54. See also Moriconi, 280 F. Supp. 2d at 874 (“The
statutory language, the legislative history, and the savings clause compel the
conclusion that Congress envisioned that consumers would not be deprived of
their state law causes of action for consumer related fraud.”).
83
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4. Similarities to Ordinary Preemption Statutes
¶29
Rather than bearing much similarity to statutes found to completely
preempt state law claims such as the NBA and ERISA, the FCA’s
preemption provision more closely resembles statutes recently found to
contain only ordinary preemption powers. One of these statutes is the
Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”),89 which, as the
Supreme Court recently recognized in Lorillard Tobacco, preempts certain
state laws regulating cigarette advertising through ordinary preemption.90
The FCLAA’s preemption clause provides that “[n]o requirement or
prohibition based on smoking and health shall be imposed under State law
with respect to the advertising or promotion of any cigarettes the packages
of which are labeled in conformity with the provisions of this chapter.”91
¶30
Interpreting the scope of the FCLAA’s preemption powers, the
Supreme Court concluded that although the FCLAA prohibits state
regulation of cigarette advertising, the statute “still leaves significant power
in the hands of States to impose generally applicable zoning regulations and
to regulate conduct.”92 The Court noted a Senate Report that explained that
the FCLAA’s preemption clause

[W]ould in no way affect the power of any State . . . with respect to the
taxation or the sale of cigarettes to minors, or the prohibition of
smoking in public buildings, or similar police regulations. It is limited
entirely to State or local requirements or prohibitions in the advertising
of cigarettes.93

Comparing the language of the FCA to both the FCLAA and the
NBA reveals that the FCA has much more in common with the former than
the latter. The limited language of the FCLAA’s preemption clause and the
qualifications on its preemption power noted in the accompanying Senate
Report closely resemble the FCA’s preemption clause and House Budget
Committee Report. Like the FCA, the FCLAA exhibits no fear of state
interference and in fact envisions a substantial state role in cigarette
regulation. The narrow scope of these statutes is strikingly different from
the broad preemption clauses contained in statutes such as the NBA and
ERISA.
¶31

¶32
These differences strongly suggest that Congress intended the
FCA’s preemption clause to only support the ordinary preemption of
specific state law claims. The FCA clearly envisions states having a
89

15 U.S.C. § 1331, et seq. (2000).
Lorillard Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525, 551 (2001).
91
15 U.S.C. § 1334 (2000).
92
Lorillard Tobacco, 533 U.S. at 551.
93
Id. at 552 n.* (quoting S. Rep. No. 91-566 (1969), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2652, 2663).
90
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substantial role in wireless regulation. It was therefore a misapplication of
the Supreme Court’s preemption jurisprudence for the Seventh Circuit to
circumvent the well-pleaded complaint rule by permitting the removal of
Bastien’s state law claims to federal court.

B. Statutory Context
The Bastien court’s misapplication of the complete preemption
doctrine is at least partially explained by its failure to interpret the FCA’s
Section 322 preemption clause in its proper statutory context. The Supreme
Court recently reiterated that when interpreting statutory language that may
be ambiguous, “[i]t is a ‘fundamental canon of statutory construction that
the words of a statute must be read in their context and with a view to their
place in the overall statutory scheme.’”94 Yet, the Bastien court’s heavy
reliance on Central Office Telephone reflects a misunderstanding of Section
332’s proper context within the FCA’s regulatory regime.

¶33

¶34
The court in Central Office Telephone held that the filed-tariff
requirements of the FCA preempted a plaintiff’s state law claims against
AT&T’s long-distance telephone service.95 Under the FCA, common
carriers are “required to file with the FCC ‘schedules,’ i.e., tariffs, ‘showing
all charges’ and ‘showing the classifications, practices, and regulations
affecting such charges.’”96 Consequently, the “filed rate doctrine forbids a
regulated entity from charging rates ‘for its services other than those
properly filed with the appropriate federal regulatory authority.’”97
¶35
Unlike their land-line cousins, wireless service providers do not
have to file rate schedules with the FCC. Instead, the FCA envisions
wireless rate setting through market competition.98 The FCC has
accordingly held that the filed rate doctrine is inapplicable to wireless
service.99 It was therefore inappropriate for the Seventh Circuit to
extrapolate Congress’s preemptive intent from a case arising under the filed
rate doctrine to a case concerning wireless regulation. Hence, the court read
the ambiguous language of the FCA’s preemption clause out of context and
without proper reference to its overall place in the FCA’s statutory scheme.
94

Food and Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120,
133 (2000) (quoting Davis v. Mich. Dep’t of Treasury, 489 U.S. 803, 809
(1989)).
95
AT&T Co. v. Cent. Office Tel., 524 U.S. 214, 228 (1998).
96
Id. at 221 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 203(a) (2000)).
97
In re Wireless Consumers Alliance, Inc., 15 F.C.C.R. 17021, 17029 (2000)
(quoting Ark. La. Gas Co. v. Hall, 453 U.S. 571, 577 (1981)).
98
See id. at 17032 (“the CMRS-customer relationship” is governed “by the
mechanisms of a competitive marketplace”).
99
See id. (“[T]he argument of CMRS providers ignores the fact that the filed
rate cases arose under a totally different regulatory regime . . . .”).
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Interpreting ambiguous language out of context increases the
danger of misinterpreting Congress’s true intention. This is particularly true
when dealing with the complete preemption doctrine, where Congressional
intent is of paramount importance. It is quite possible, for instance, that
because the FCA gives the FCC a greater role in land-line rate setting
(through rate filing) than in wireless rate setting, Congress intended the
preemptive force of land-line regulation to be greater than that of wireless
regulation. Accordingly, the interpretations of the statutes’ respective
preemption clauses are not interchangeable. The Bastien court’s reliance on
Central Office Telephone thus meant that its interpretive signals were
crossed, making an improper result almost inevitable.
¶36

CONCLUSION
In light of Beneficial and Lorillard Tobacco, it is clear that the
Bastien court misapplied the complete preemption analysis in finding that
Steven Bastien’s state law claims were removable to federal court.
Although his claims may indeed have been preempted by federal law,
Congress did not intend for the FCA to have the same extraordinary
preemptive power contained in the NBA, ERISA, and the LMRA. Unlike
these latter statutes, the FCA’s preemption power is limited by its savings
clause, failure to establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme, and
provision of a significant role for state regulation. The FCA instead closely
resembles statutes such as the FCLAA that only possess ordinary
preemption powers. The Seventh Circuit should therefore have remanded
Bastien’s case back to state court for further adjudication.100

¶37

¶38
As similar issues are sure to be litigated for some time, courts
attempting to reconcile Bastien should keep its missteps in mind. Federal
courts can avoid a messy attempt at defining the scope of FCA preemption
by adhering to the well-pleaded complaint rule and remanding cases to state
court. State courts could then use the ordinary preemption analysis to
evaluate claims on a case by case basis. If Congress really meant to make
all state law claims affecting rates and market entry an exclusively federal
concern removable to federal court, it must pass legislation explicitly stating
this intent.101

100

See Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1313 (11th Cir. 2001) (“our
conclusion that the complete preemption doctrine does not provide a basis for
federal jurisdiction in this action [arising under 47 U.S.C. § 207] does not
preclude the parties from litigation about the preemptive effect . . . of the . . .
[FCA] in any subsequent state court action.”).
101
See, e.g., El Paso Natural Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999)
(explaining that the Price-Anderson Act, 42 U.S.C. § 2210(n)(2) (2000),
expressly provides for removal of tort actions arising out of nuclear accidents to
federal court even when they assert only state law claims).

